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ABSTRACT:  The European Union was born under the sign of ‘unity in diversity’ and 
pluralism. Such a design with its rather oxymoronic combination of ends has so far found an 
institutional and procedural synthesis. From a cultural point of view, however, Europe is 
divided, and efforts towards anthropological translation, at least in as reflected by the law, have 
so far been very scant. This diffraction results in a legal pluralism that addresses the national 
cultures as if they were parallel entities and, just like in a Euclidean universe, doomed never to 
meet. This essay aims at opening a pathway to develop a European legal interculture, as an 
outcome of both anthropological-spatial understanding – chorology – and legal experience aligned 
with the needs of European citizens and amenable to support the project of a Europe whose 
‘unity’ may no longer consist of reciprocal cultural indifference. A Europe that no longer shares a 
common space of justice but rather, precisely, shares an interspace of a common justice. 
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Europe is united, but the cultures within it are not. This is the current state and 
it certainly looks like something of a paradox. However, logical paradoxes often 
persist inside historical processes. Through the course of political and social 
development, the pace of change is marked by transformations, their phases, and 
the coexistence of contradictions. Sudden changes and revolutions before and 
after confirm the resilience of cultural habits, traditions, and previously established 
customs. The old and the new, the synchronous and the asynchronous live 
together in the traces of history. The European Union is a project, whereas the 
anthropological landscapes and the ethno-legal mentalities of people have already 
been cemented into place and have become realities. To make matters worse, these 
landscapes and mentalities are in no way homogenous. The ethno-political 
tensions especially within the nation states (such as Scotland, Catalonia, the Basque 
Country, Yugoslavia and also the antagonism between the south and the north of 
Italy) provide clear evidence of this lack of uniformity. What are the strategies 
deployed by European institutions to address these cultural discrepancies, these 
different imaginaries of subjectivity? What instruments have been devised so far to 
realize the ideal of ‘unity in diversity,’ that is the motto of European Union itself? 
How are such differences and the corresponding claims for justice combined and 
simultaneously addressed by European institutions? What are the institutional and 
normative devices used to reach these ends? 
 The answer to all these questions lie in a single watchword: pluralism. In this 
essay, I do not deal with the technical arrangements engaged by the communitarian 
institution in order to implement the steering wheel of ‘pluralism’. Rather, I will try 
to cast a gaze on these tools — so to speak — from the outside or, at least, from a 
distance. Thus, I will not take into account the institutional technicalities in and of 
themselves, primarily considered in their procedural form. On the contrary, the 
subject-matter of my inquiry will be the ‘raw material’ of legal experience, that is: a) 
the socio-anthropological meanings “poured” or to be poured into the procedural 
engine; b) the methods employed to gather and transform them; c) the teleological 
congruence between their meanings, and the normative outcomes obtained at the 
end of institutional processes designed to induce the political-cultural integration 
of Europeans.  
2. The pyramidal approach to the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
My argument takes its cue just from the proclaimed pluralist vocation of 
supranational legislation and its hermeneutical standards. I begin with the 
European Charter of Fundamental Rights and the interpretative activity of the 
ECHR. Subsidiarity (both vertical and horizontal), proportionality, and margin of 
appreciation are all standard/widely used formulas aimed at underpinning a 
pluralist application of the Charter. They join the assessment of the legitimacy of 
national laws which tries to be as responsive as possible to local demands. Now, I 
will not linger on a description and analysis of these hermeneutical standards. I will 
focus, instead on the pyramidal approach discernible in the interpretation of the 
Charter and in the use of its axiological and normative patterns. 
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Rights by means of vertically drawn semantic coordination lines. The congruence 
sought between particular and general, local and supranational, resolve, in this way, 
in a poly-topic, or multi-local, disarticulation of the normative principles processed 
at the central level. All this takes place, unfortunately, without promoting any 
intercultural and horizontal translation between cultural differences, or between 
the different ‘dialects’ of social and legal subjectivity experienced by people in their 
own countries. The pluralist claim for the recognition and the protection of 
differences triggers a sort of antagonistic race to inscribe one’s own cultural 
specificities (often, only postulated rather than argued) in the apical lexicon of 
European institutions. So, the heterogenesis of ends proves to be the crux of this 
approach. In the end, the proclamation and the end of ‘unity in diversity’ 
(notwithstanding the differences) ends up being converted into a form of pseudo-
union in reciprocal indifference. Moreover, this kind of indifference is perceived and 
rhetorically displayed as a sort of “optimum horizon,” the very mirror of a 
pluralism that serves as a bulwark for the recognition of political and cultural 
differences. All this, however, is little more than an illusion, because that horizon is 
simultaneously made unreachable by the pressures towards homologation 
prompted by countries that are more powerful politically and economically. A 
homologation that, in turn, impacts on the style of interpretation of fundamental 
rights and, as a cascade, also impacts on the categories of legal subjectivity so 
grafted by institutional means onto the social practices of the whole of Europe. 
 This undoubtedly represents the outcome of a deficient vision of European 
integration. An integration that seems from the outset to give up on a process that 
strives for translation/transaction between the anthropological landscapes of the 
various peoples of Europe or their expressions of legal subjectivity. And yet, in the 
absence of translations and transactions of these Europeans’ cultural 
encyclopedias, achieving the goal of creating an interculturally fashioned legal and 
social subjectivity will be impossible. Regardless of any legal intercultural process, 
and until the semantics of quotidian coexistence are not inflected by it, European 
people cannot effectively participate in a common citizenship. This is so also 
because citizenship is not exclusively a matter of formal awards, labels, public 
repertoires or certificates. All these ‘materials’ should be considered not as 
premises but rather as consequences, as political-bureaucratic results stemming 
from anthropologically shared practices and coming from the unfolding of 
individual agency merged into the stream of quotidian life.. 
 Creating an interculturally devised grammar of European subjectivity requires 
an interdisciplinary effort. The legal systems of diverse nation-states must be 
involved, to begin with. To assume that it would be possible to embark on such an 
endeavor without a careful assessment of the member states legal systems and 
their differences is purely chimerical. Any pathway of cultural cohesion must come 
to terms with the law. In the absence of such coordination, any true effectiveness 
would be hopeless. Culture inhabits symbolic imagery but also pragmatic 
experience alike. Ideas, thoughts, have consequences; as they morph into practice, 
that is, actions and behaviors, they inevitably bump into laws, and into institutional 
and social norms. To align the efforts of cultural translation with legal standards 
becomes consequently an inescapable prerequisite. Otherwise, the law will be deaf 
to intercultural endeavors and it will work as an obstacle to cultural change and act 
as a censor, inevitably conservative and nationalist, against any project with 
integration aims. 
 On the other hand, comparative analysis, if strictly limited to positive data, will 
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overlapping or adjusting their merely normative diversities1. Persons are not norms 
– fortunately. On the contrary, norms are designed to formally precipitate 
traditions of justice, shared mentalities, anthropological patterns, ethical standards, 
customs etc., all forged and at the disposal of people in service to their ability to 
plan their own actions. All of this ‘symbolic matter’ is much more malleable than 
the normative assertions, even if it is the very source of them. Not surprisingly, 
people, on average and especially when they wander across national borders, are 
not so much concerned with the preservation of their previous normative 
apparatuses, but rather with the possibility of retaining their underlying weave of 
sense, even if transformed. This is because there are very few people, in everyday 
life, that respect the law because they know it. The ignorantia legis non excusat 
principle does not work because it is rooted in the actual and direct knowledge of 
formal normative apparatuses.. In fact, that principle — in itself quite absurd — 
relies on a total correspondence and practical convergence between law and 
culture, normative sets and customs, legal rules and habits of life. Legal norms owe 
their effectiveness to the underlying presence of behavioral habits coextensive with 
the contents of legal apparatuses and ubiquitous among people. These habits are 
steadily at work as a hidden or mute part, and yet they are indispensable to the 
legislation of every country. They are the backdrop and the prerequisite for the 
effectiveness of the rules enacted by institutions. 
 When norms confront processes of socio-cultural de-contextualization, their 
chances of effectiveness inevitably decline. If cross-contextual knowledge of 
cultural backgrounds (tacitly presupposed by the diverse legal systems) is lacking, 
the chances of unearthing common ground, of engaging in translation and 
transaction between the legal apparatuses, becomes almost impossible. The 
horizon of normative languages, considered in its formal sense, reveals only what 
is already visible: the words inserted into laws are the sole guarantee for the 
correspondence between culture and institutional rules. Any changes, adjustments 
or re-molding of the linguistic-normative tenor therefore morph into the danger of 
cultural break up. The possibility of managing the integration process among 
different people through comparative analysis and inter-normative interpretation 
thus proves to be an unenforceable enterprise, doomed to fail or at least to result 
in flawed outcomes. 
 The history of attempts by European institutions toward normative unification 
or alignment between nations launched via contracts, inheritance or family laws 
and so on, is a path studded with failed attempts. After all, when the rigidity of 
norms is taken to be the sole expression of a whole culture, to compromise or give 
up that rigidity is necessarily felt as a self-damaging act targeting one’s own 
identity. Thus, the inherent rigidity of legal languages ends up answering the 
analogue ‘stiffness’ of ideological tenets. The challenge of a culturally transactional 
integration under these conditions looks lost from the start. For precisely this 
reason, a successful translation between legal systems requires observing them 
through a historical-anthropological lens. For this purpose, a process of immersion 
in the different mentalities, following the traces and the historical features still 
resilient within and beneath the current legal settings, is fundamental,. That which 
is to be translated, and is actually amenable to creative translation/transaction, 
coincides with the habits, the underlying keys of sense, reflexively re-interpreted by 
                    ___________________________ 
1 With regard to the ‘institutional fashion’ (but lacking of any anthropological referral) of theoretical 
efforts oriented to conceptualize pluralism in European Union, see Giuseppe Martinico, The Tangled 
Complexity of the EU Constitutional Process: The Frustrating Knot of Europe (London – New York: 
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the parties involved in negotiations for political and inter-normative 
harmonization. But, without an adequate historical awareness and a skillful 
anthropological review, the subjects requested to manage the 
translation/transaction processes will inevitably end up stranded on the shoals of 
sterile wars struggling for the single word to use, in turn perceived as a blazon and 
a banner of the identity of each of the parties2. 
 The exhausting iterations of useless negotiations often lead European 
institutions to take two apparently opposite approaches. Homogeneous normative 
solutions, which are in reality fictions of a sort, since they lack any integration, may 
be imposed — if at all — from above and authoritatively. In these circumstances, 
the power of authority shows its Gorgon’s features. The more powerful nation-
states avail themselves of their ability to influence political choices. This, however, 
is not always a viable solution. When there are many fronts of diversity, marked by 
a strong symbolic desire for identity, the strategy used is generally different. Under 
the rubric of pluralism, European institutions enact normative provisions that 
allow each country the possibility of preserving rules, jurisprudential veins, 
institutional practices and habits of legal subjectivity that are substantially 
differentiated and parallel. Nonetheless, both strategies — very frequently adopted 
— give rise to two essentially convergent questions. 
 Faced with normative unification managed and imposed from above, what will 
become of the cultural differences engrained in the daily life of European people 
and not legally recognized? Are we to think that they will vanish in a whisper, 
merely evaporating? Or, rather, will those differences continue to live parallel lives, 
perhaps hiding in the shadows of the official legal practices? Or, instead, within the 
inconsistencies of the formal norms so as to produce a sort of heterogenesis of its 
less acceptable effects?  
 Often, inside local dimensions, European provisions characterized by 
homologating consequences undergo some transfigurations. These occur 
simultaneous to their implementation within contexts connoted by the socio-
cultural variables idiomatic of each area. 
 Conversely, is not the radically pluralist solution — even if only in appearance 
— that commits some areas to autonomous regulation by individual national 
institutions likely to engender a disaggregated Europe? And is not such a lack of 
coordination, alongside the absence of a common lexicon for European legal 
subjectivity, in danger of letting the normative schemas framed by the more 
powerful countries prevail, at least in the long term? A danger that could affect all 
the situations in which individuals from different countries interact? The 
occurrence of such an eventuality, tied to the overlapping of different subjectivities 
and spatial dimensions of law, has a precise legal-geographical, indeed 
‘chorological’ determinant. I will address it below.3. 
                    ___________________________ 
2 Anthropological research has not been a part of the development of the European community. 
More recently, some scholars have focused on the construction of European identity through 
cultural-political instruments managed from above. The psycho-social dimension is instead 
understood in two directions: the relationships between the cd. Eurocrats, i.e., officials of different 
cultures involved in Community institutions, and the rights of cultural and/or linguistic minorities 
scattered across different national contexts. However, the problems related to inter-normative 
translation, considered on a large scale as an essential counterpart of political-cultural integration, 
have remained privy of an anthropological perspective. In this regard, see Andrés Barrera-
González, Towards an Anthropology of Europe: Outline for a Teaching and Research Agenda, in Anthropology 
of Europe: Teaching and Research, ed. Petr Skalník (Prague: Set Out, 2004), 3-25; Lisanne Wilken, 
Anthropological Studies of European Identity Construction, in Companion to the Anthropology of Europe, ed. 
Ullrich Kocjel et al. (Malden (MA) – Oxford – Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012), 125-44. 
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 At this point, it is important to underline that the “do it yourself” pluralism, 
meaning nationally defined choices in legal policy, may prove illusory. This is so 
because people and their own interests cross nation-state borders continuously, 
making the territorial edges of sovereignty irrelevant. Considering this 
circumstance, the idea that when at home everyone does what is most comfortable 
to his culture, imagined as a kind of entity isolated from the rest of the world, may 
prove to be a completely misplaced concept, detached from historical reality and 
fundamentally unworkable. Political isolation and cultural disaggregation could 
turn out to be, in short, losing strategies, both economically and in terms of the 
concrete establishment of ethno-cultural rights. The rhythms of transnational 
inter-subjectivity could trigger dynamics of a one-way inter-constitutionality. They 
would proceed, in all likelihood, from the more powerful countries towards the 
weaker ones, but not vice versa. In one shot, both projections of pluralism would 
be betrayed. I refer respectively to the infra-state pluralism, and the exo-state 
pluralism that is attuned to the global dimension of the cultural, political and 
economic experiences undertaken by different subjects of law. In the name of the 
ethno-ethical flexibility recognized by Europe with regard to national legal policies, 
nation states would find themselves virtually enabled to crush internal minorities 
including, of course, those present as a result of migration flows4. At the same 
time, the same national states and their dominant groups would ultimately suffer 
the effects of a counter-homologation factor set in motion by the transnational 
dimensions of individual experience subdued to the normative patterns enforced 
by the stronger countries to regulate and control the interests circling around 
them. 
 As a partial answer to the questions and doubts advanced so far, the 
protection of the so-called ‘essential core,’ the kernel of rights provided by the 
European Charter of Fundamental Rights, is often invoked. According to this 
principle, both in the case of the solutions imposed from above, and in the case of 
self-determination at the state level, violations of the core of fundamental rights 
would be countermanded. But the definition of ‘the core' is already difficult 
enough in itself without inviting cultural difference issues to the table5. Indeed, 
                    ___________________________                
una corologia giuridica, in Il principio di sussidiarietà nel diritto privato, I, ed. Mario Nuzzo (Torino: 
Giappichelli, 2015), 15-77; Id, “Uso interculturale dei diritti mani e corologia giuridica,” Humanitas 
69 (4-5 2014): 734-50. 
4 Examples of states adopting policies and regulations strongly inspired by a kind of ethno-national 
localism are all too easy to find, even within the very jurisprudence of the ECHR regarding 
fundamental rights; they can be clearly seen throughout the argumentative arsenal used by Court, 
consisting of standards of evaluation such as “margin of appreciation,” “principle of 
proportionality,” and even the “principle of subsidiarity.” See Marie-Bénédict Dembour, Who 
Believes in Human Rights? Reflection on the European Convention (New York: CUP, 2006); Alessandra 
Pera, The ‘Margin of Appreciation’ in ECHR Case-Law As a Boundary Line to Legal Transplants, in The 
Diffusion of Law: The Movement of Laws and Norms Around the World, ed. Sue Farran et al. (Aldershot: 
Ashgate, 2015, forthcoming.). 
5 See Mireille von Hildebrandt, “Human Rights as preconditions of an intercultural society,” in Selected 
Works of Mireille von Hildebrandt, accessed January 2010, http://works.bepress.com/mireille_ 
hildebrandt/28. In this essay there are references to the methodology to be used to avoid a 'vertical' 
and essentialist use of statements on rights. On the question of the "core" of rights, there is also the 
problem of the tension between the core of rights relevant to European citizenship and the 
fundamental rights and liberties of the European Union as defined by multilateral and multicultural 
readings. This tension has emerged as a result of the well-known ECJ decision Ruiz Zambrano. In 
this regard, see Hanneke van Eijken and Sybe A. De Vries, “A New Route into the Promised Land? 
Being a European Citizen after Ruiz Zambrano,” in European Law Review, 36/5 (2011) 704-21; and 
for positions favorable to the dissolving of this tension, mainly through systematic and institutional 
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adopting a different cultural perspective often means decentralizing the gaze, de-
essentializing the process oriented to the construction of judgments, and thus 
restating the relationship between what is central and what is peripheral within 
each category currently used. Relying upon the principle of the inviolability of the 
'core' of fundamental rights as an antidote to the shortfall of interculturality in the 
actions of European institutions might be compared to prescribing fasting to a 
patient suffering from malnutrition. 
 In the world imagined by Euclid with his fifth theorem, parallels are destined 
never to meet. Their fate is to proceed in space simultaneously and symmetrically 
but strictly independent, without any possible intersection. Similarly, cultural and 
legal pluralism as seen in the European Community experience — at least so far 
— shows a historical path of national entities programmed to maintain a mutually 
unbridgeable distance. Whether homologated or divergent from national laws and 
the cultural patterns underlying them, the legal cultures of Europeans seem to 
impede them from the possibility of meeting, thereby obstructing any possible 
efforts towards their intercultural translation. 
 Geometrical space, however, is not the same as historical and political space. 
If the political one can be imagined as empty, postulating for each parallel line a 
fixed distance from the other, the cultural and vital space, on the contrary, appears 
to be always populated and marked by the meanings attributed to what is 
occurring within it. The possibility of maintaining a fixed distance depends on the 
relationships of meaning that each line of conduct and the corresponding category 
used to symbolically represent it hold with all the others and with their 
connotations as well. The developing of these lines of action will therefore unfold 
through a space curved by the implications of meaning, by the symbolic and 
pragmatic connections that the same lines will interweave with each other. 
Therefore, it is up to these traces of involvement to determine what is distant and 
what is near, what is tangent and what is divergent, what intersects and what 
moves asymptotically. 
 The impossibility of conceiving a political and cultural vacuum not curved by 
relations of meaning, a space where each entity is isolated and conceptually 
separated from the other, suggests that interculturality occurs anyway, even when it 
is denied or not cultivated as a public end at the institutional level. 
 European unification may have played a part in generating some sort of 
political-geometrical illusion. The common European space was imagined as 
institutionally continuous, as if it had been already (culturally) homogeneous, a 
tendency symptomatically betrayed by the widespread rhetoric about the 
emergence of a European citizenship. This "European citizen" is indeed a figure 
obtained through a hyper-abstraction from the concrete political and cultural 
dynamics, and fashioned by ignoring the differences rather than translating and 
transacting with them (within inclusive interpretive and normative schemes). The 
fictitious homogeneity imagined by ‘European citizenship’ is, in all probability, the 
same ingredient that allowed the postulation of the existence of a uniform empty 
space, where every country, every culture, can be kept as a parallel entity as 
appropriate to a Euclidean space. In many respects, however, it is a mystifying 
representation, mirroring the image created by the rhetoric of globalization. And 
so what is proposed is a world of entities scattered through a space populated by 
incommensurable and reciprocal diversities which nonetheless undergo an 
                    ___________________________                
artistica in un contesto di intercostituzionalità,”, in Arte e critica, special issue on Nuove Alleanze. 
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unavoidable, though contradictory, process of homologation. In the case of a 
United Europe, conversely, it is a unification which has already taken place at the 
institutional level and which presumes a homogeneous space where differences 
can be configured and safeguarded as a projection of a pluralism orchestrated from 
above. Either way, in my view, the cognitive/cultural deficit persists and is caused 
by errors in the legal-institutional project planning and the strategies of political 
action. So, pyramidal/hierarchical interpretations of human rights, as well as the 
fundamental rights of the European Union, are exactly the opposite of what might 
facilitate intercultural translation and transaction processes. In order for these 
processes to take substance, it is necessary instead to think about the discourse on 
rights as an interface for translation between different cultural traditions and legal 
mentalities put in action by the various people of Europe as their everyday lives 
unfold within the changing spaces and inter-spaces of individual existence. 
3. Intercultural Uses of Fundamental Rights of UE and 
legal European Intersubjectivity 
The political imagination of EU institutions cannot seem to wriggle free from a 
logical hierarchical/ pyramidal outlook in its interpretation and implementation of 
human and/or fundamental rights even when spurred by the best intentions. For 
ample proof of this phenomenon one only has to read the White Paper on 
Intercultural Dialogue subtitled ‘Living Together in Equal Dignity,’ that was 
drafted in 2008, the so proclaimed ‘Year of Intercultural Dialogue.’ The entire text 
is crammed with references to diversity, respect for pluralism and mutual dialogue 
between the different European identities. The whole project, outlined by the 
White Paper, is intended to pave a path of integration that respects and includes  
cultural differences within the framework of human and/or fundamental rights. 
However, no mention is made in the paper regarding how to translate these 
differences, what methodologies are to be used to decipher them, how to generate 
patterns of transaction obtained through equivalences of meaning understood 
beyond the morphological diversities and their associated symbolic-identitarian 
stiffening. Even more importantly, this paper does not give any indication of how 
dialogue might be given a voice towards the development of normative parameters 
inclusive of the cultural differences at stake. Beyond the evocative and almost 
magical power bestowed upon the adjective “intercultural,” there is little of any 
concrete value. Conversely, the hymn sung to difference, conceived as a value in 
and of itself by the Paper, seems to provide little more than background music to 
accompany the ongoing reciprocal indifference among European peoples. 
 With the universality of human and/or fundamental rights and the semantic 
vagueness of their enunciations as a backdrop, every group and every individual 
can claim their own exclusive identity to be subsequently negotiated in the arena of 
political-institutional confrontations. The result of these negotiations in normative 
terms, however, can only consist of a solution with a dual output: a) serializing and 
homogenizing solutions, devised according to the preferences of the most 
powerful; b) nomothetic devices inspired by procedural justice, through which 
everyone can self-determine within a very vague framework. In other words, we 
have the triumph of Euclidean political geometry or, rather, an oxymoronic "plane 
of parallel convergences". 
 The White Paper on Intercultural Dialogue actually says very little about law 
and normative solutions. In any case the editors of the document, not lawyers but 
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They could reproach me for promoting a law-centric vision of intercultural 
relations, while they would engage, instead, on a cultural level, precisely that of the 
free exchange of ideas, creativity, and arts. I could, in short, be accused of having a 
narrow vision worthy of a bureaucrat, constrained to think of politics as a mere 
hotbed of institutional and legalistic cages for curtailing human experience, rather 
than a cultural phenomenon. However, as will emerge from the pages of this 
paper, there is no need to convince me that intercultural dynamics are to be 
managed first and foremost on an anthropological ground rather than on a legal 
one; or, to put it differently, that anthropological-translation processes must come 
before any determination of the content of intercultural law provisions. The most 
relevant question, however, seems to me to be another. 
 I think, and I have also ascertained it through field research,6 that intercultural 
processes are likely to remain inconsequential in the absence of specific support 
directed to urge normative agencies to listen to claims resulting from cultural 
difference. As long as the law remains deaf to the demands coming from 
intercultural experiences, it runs the risk of perishing on paper. However, if we are 
to fill legal forms with intercultural substance, specific intercultural methodologies 
are necessary to forge a path through a legislative planning process that can assure 
their transaction within inclusive conceptual and legal frames; the contextualization 
of cross-cultural differences, via a process of anthropological translation, is 
fundamental. In short, to effectively enhance intercultural dialogue, European 
institutions must take part in the birthing of intercultural law and, even before, the 
elaboration of nomothetic techniques required to imagine and realize it. 
 Although it may seem paradoxical, hanging the realization of a European area 
of intercultural coexistence on the aprioristic universality of human and/or 
fundamental rights is exactly the opposite of what might serve its purposes. Every 
culture has the theoretical possibility of being mirrored in the spectrum of 
semantic statements of rights or, at least, the ethical principles that they recall. 
After all, who does not recognize in the ideas of equality, fraternity, and justice, a 
respect for people and their dignity, freedom, equality, and so on? The problem 
lies in the fact that these ideas are subsequently interpreted very differently 
according to cultural glasses worn by each community or individual, spatially and 
historically situated. Even considering only the European scenario, taking a 
common constitutional heritage for granted means little if the practical 
implications of ‘fundamental rights’ are not attentively reviewed. On the other 
hand, these implications are intertwined, in both a semiotic and pragmatic sense, 
with conceptual schemes acted out by people in different contexts. These are the 
same conceptual schemes that can be found formally transfigured in the different 
traditions of statutory laws that regulate the daily life of people by means of the 
various legal institutes. Human and/or fundamental rights gain their significance 
and practical implications because of the adjustments taking place between the 
semantic spectrum of their statements and the contents of the laws in force in 
different countries. Inheritance laws, contracts, crime laws and so on, take on a 
cultural bent and a normative substance that is very different in each of the 
countries of Europe – which itself is nothing compared to what blatantly emerges 
when you cross the borders of the Old Continent. As long as a serious 
commitment to translate each of these cultural habits, and the legal institutes that 
engage them normatively, into another is lacking, efforts to invoke human and/or 
fundamental rights in the hope of getting intercultural dialogue to flourish will 
come to nothing. Rather, each of the countries involved in this endeavor will end 
                    ___________________________ 
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up identifying its own legal and cultural tradition as the prototypical 
implementation of human and/or fundamental rights7. Consequently, any national 
legal system will consider possible differences from their prototype as 
unacceptable as if they were evidence of inhumanity. Resting on these 
assumptions, any proposal of intercultural transaction will appear as an 
unjustifiable attack on their identity. The semantic stiffness of rules, then, will 
bring the rest to completion. Finally, the intercultural transaction will end up being 
conflated with the inter-normative transaction or, better, with the ordinary 
‘untransactability’ of normative contents. At that point, authentic wars will erupt in 
order to establish the ‘true meaning’ of human and/or fundamental rights and 
their corresponding more suitable (prototypical) implementations through the 
institutes provided by the national statutory laws. 
 But is a different and perhaps more effective approach to the challenges of 
intercultural European integration and its legal and institutional implications really 
within reach? I am inclined to give an optimistic answer. I think, however, that to 
set off in the right direction, some assumptions must be outlined. 
 a) Inter-legality as interculturality.  
The starting point for a genuinely intercultural declination of the motto "unity 
in diversity" should be the idea, and subsequently the belief, that the inter-legality 
between European countries—also in the form of inter-constitutionality—is 
synonymous with interculture. This assumption implies that it is not possible and 
that is to be considered a useless effort to find common legal platforms before 
common cultural platforms have been identified. As a corollary of this argument, 
we should introduce the postulate that without a prior survey conducted in 
anthropological depths (and, therefore, historical-geographical ones, too) the 
creation/invention of common laws8 in any set of legal areas would be in vain, or 
at least damaged by significant cognitive and informative deficits. What must be 
integrated first and foremost are the people, not the rules. Cultural habits are much 
more flexible than forms and legal statements, despite the fact that the latter are 
intended as a sort of projection of the former. Furthermore, people have political 
agency, the rules in and of themselves do not. If questioned, normative statements 
remain silent or otherwise express only what their interpreters say on their behalf. 
In other words, the rules themselves cannot go beyond their reciprocal and textual 
diversity. That is why the technocrats engaged in EU legislative planning 
committees should look beyond the rules, and instead draw on mentalities and 
customs, put them and their owners in dialogue, even better through 
anthropological-legal surveys. This should be their actual area of research in the 
pursuit of a horizon of integration. Sitting at the table, trying to translate and 
compromise texts as if they were the essence of the people, namely the future 
subjects of rules intended for ‘Europeans,’ is likely to produce few results and, 
indeed, is likely to foment the welding together of ethnic-identitarian and 
normative rigidities. 
b) Intercultural methodology. Narratives, crossed-contextualizations, 
translations/transactions. 
Once the interdependence of both legal analysis and anthropological insight of 
the intercultural horizon are a given, we must identify how this ‘tandem’ should be 
                    ___________________________ 
7 See Xenia Chryssochoou, Cultural Diversity: Its Social Deiversity, (Malden, Mass. – Oxford – Carlton, 
Vicatoria: Balckwell, 2004); Costas Douzinas, The End of Human Rights: Critical Legal Thought at the 
Turn of the Century, (Oxford – Portland: Hart Publishing 2000), and Hildebrand, Human Rights. 
8 The formula ‘commons laws’ is inspired by Patrick H. Glenn, On Common Laws, (Oxford: Oxford 
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articulated in procedural terms and what its object should be. In this regard, it 
must be considered that any form of inter-normative translation must undergo, in 
a particular and accentuated way, the same limitations that characterize linguistic 
translation. Each linguistic utterance and its use rest on contexts of experience 
impossible to transfer point by point (or matrix by matrix) each upon the other. 
The equivalences of meaning always involve transformation. This, however, does 
not necessarily constitute a loss, but it is rather the engine of the translation 
process. To translate is to transpose the Other’s experiential dimension into one’s 
own experience. But ‘transposition’ does not mean mimetic annulment. 
Throughout the effort of translation, the Self or the translating culture has to 
maintain its own Otherness. Moreover, in the case of legal translation, especially 
when utilized to accomplish legal transplants, the maintenance of the identity of 
the translator enlivens the process with even more vivid axiological colors. The 
language used by the law has very tight constraints of semantic pertinence. This is 
because with regard to the law, every option for using a particular word 
corresponds to precise value choices conveyed by political decisions and endowed 
with immediate practical consequences. To understand why the law of a particular 
country uses one or more specific words to name and define a given behavior 
requires an investigation into the historical-narrative paths that led to that choice. 
 The first step in tracking down semantic platforms useful to managing 
processes of inter-normative transaction/translation involves the production of 
narratives that involve a cross-cultural history of the individual institutes. The 
history of the words used must be retraced, however, by the right means, if we are 
to penetrate the plots of cultural anthropology. This operation can provide the 
precise building blocks for the next activity of intercultural translation/transaction. 
 The second step, just subsequent to the narratives crossed—but only in logical 
and certainly not chronological terms, since the two actions overlap in practice—is 
the cross-contextualization of narratives made by the cultural actors involved in 
each case. Understanding (but also processing) a narrative actually requires a work 
of contextualization and inter-contextualization. And it is so simply because no 
one can map the contexts of meaning encapsulated in the narratives of Others 
without employing elements from their own contexts of experience and 
knowledge, their own semiotic framework. Nonetheless, there is a way to avoid the 
risks of domesticating or ethnocentric interpretations, stemming from the false 
assumption that one’s own conceptual schemes are universal or ‘natural.' This is to 
use contextualization as a reflexive key, by drawing out elements to question, 
decipher, and urge the other actors to enrich, integrate, and specify their self-
narratives.9. Such a task must necessarily be pursued in a bi- or multi-lateral way. 
Without a shuttling effect, coextensive with the game of reciprocal questions and 
answers, a false representation of the Other’s mind and culture would be 
impossible to overcome. As the parties produce more detailed narratives, behind 
every single word or phrase a network of semiotic relations will begin to take 
shape. What is important to emphasize is that the narratives created on each side 
of the translation process will have specular features because they will be imbued 
with cultural contexts and connotations expressed on the other side. More directly, 
an Englishman will describe himself to a Chinese person very differently than he 
will to a Ghanaian. Intercultural processes are a prism in which even the 
                    ___________________________ 
9 For bibliographical references about this topic, see Mario Ricca, “Intercultural Law, Interdisciplinary 
Outlines: Lawyering and Anthropological Expertise: Before the Courts,” in E/C, accessed March 3, 2014, 
www.ec-aiss.it, 1-53; Id. Culture interdette. Modernità, migrazioni, diritto interculturale, (Torino: Bollati 
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knowledge of the Self acquires different facets depending on the interlocutor, the 
situation, the time, and so on. 
 These efforts of cross-contextualization, together with an increased number of 
narratives, provide semantic landscapes which gradually become richer and better 
articulated. By using them as a starting point, it will be easier to trace the 
conceptual connotations that can work as axes of equivalence between the 
categories used by languages and cultures in comparison, and to engage in inter-
subjective dialogue. The emergence of a set of semantic connotations likely to 
function as a bridge will generate progressively inter-contextual categories, 
engendering a kind of ‘third space’ which is yet continuous with semantic devices 
and apparatuses originally used by the interlocutors. 
The characteristics of ‘thirdness’ or innovation on one hand, and the continuity 
with the past on the other, coexist because the representations of their differences, 
the very awareness of them, is not immune to cultural conflict, to the strain of 
translation. That is, the differences postulated at the beginning of the process are 
simultaneously transformed and clarified through the efforts to translate, 
understand and be understood by the Other. All of this suggests that translation is 
a cognitive activity with a highly creative component, and therefore a political one 
too, especially when it results in practical effects that are immediately applicable. 
 The creativity inherent in the translation process aligns itself to metaphorical 
invention. As in  metaphors, trans-lation transposes the meaning of a word into 
and over another. In so doing, however, not just words but also contexts of 
experience are blended. The inter-contextual dimension that results is therefore 
also an inter-spatial dimension, which will serve as a background for understanding 
the significance of the actions taken by the parties as an outcome of intercultural 
exchange. Furthermore, it is a new dimension, previously non-existent, where each 
of the initial contexts of meaning and their categorical boundaries will gain some 
new elements or connotations and lose others. The words chosen for the final 
translation will constitute only the tip of the iceberg of the set of semiotic relations 
(composed of symbols as well as actual or potential experiences) drawn out by the 
work of creating the new intercultural context. Translation and creative and / or 
political transaction will then reveal themselves as two ways to define a single 
process. One might wonder, at this point, whether the inter-contextuality, and its 
corresponding inter-spatiality are only the result of intercultural translation efforts 
or perhaps  are reflective too of a pre-existing situation in some way. 
c) Space and culture. The legal chorology. The answer to the implicit question raised at 
the end of the previous paragraph constitutes the third assumption which is, in my 
view, indispensable to an intercultural integration suited to involving the legal-
institutional dimension as well. To elucidate the point, I will propose some 
questions which may appear to be against the flow of my argument. They 
showcase those arguments that might be employed by a "devil's advocate” 
interested in delegitimizing intercultural dialogue. 
 Could inter-normative syntheses between the legal traditions of the different 
EU countries be managed by a hierarchical and/or systematically procedural 
method according to fundamental rights? Should EU institutions, after a proper 
examination of differences identified with a legal view, impose uniform solutions 
capable of ensuring a European area of justice endowed with consistency and 
stability? Would stability thus achieved ensure legal certainty and a chance to 
provide security to the movements of people and things within the territorial 
circuit of the EU? And where this homogenization is not possible even by 
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room for solutions inspired by procedural justice and, therefore, oriented to a 
decentralization of powers, so as not to prejudice the cultural specificities of each 
context? Should the exercise of power and authority by EU institutions be used as 
a device to overcome the political paralysis caused by forms of defense “to the 
bitter end” of cultural specificities that are often speciously invoked for the sole 
purpose of legitimizing identitarian antagonisms or selfish and short sighted 
particularisms? 
 My answer is that the European space is already a cultural and pragmatic inter-
space. Until the recent past, the harmonization of relationships between the 
nations and peoples of Europe had as its main focus the arrangement of interests 
perceived as worthy of consideration at the level of state institutions. This is not to 
say that those interests had no impact on people's lives. I only point out that 
citizens and individuals belonging to nation-sates would have only indirectly and 
remotely perceived the disadvantageous or advantageous implications of a 
centralized management of those interests. Probably, it was a misleading illusion. 
Nonetheless, the need for peaceful, coordinated policies designed for cooperation 
rather than conflict and pertaining to a macro-systemic dimension was reserved to 
government agencies. The gaze of individuals, trained on everyday life, did not, for 
example, aspire towards a rapprochement with national laws in certain areas as a 
crucial determinant of their vicissitudes and the fate of their affairs. Indeed, if 
anything, customs and inurement to their traditions has made it rather difficult for 
national populations to accept changes imposed from above and pursued as a 
response to these kinds of concerns. 
 Of course, in the eyes of governmental operators, the interrelationship 
between law policy options astride the borders of states and the national welfare 
could also appear much more clear and compelling. However, government 
agencies must also respect the constraints of representation and, therefore, 
approval ratings affecting their elections or re-elections. The gap between their 
representation and the expectations of citizens has also ended up having an impact 
on effective management policies for European integration. Needless to say, the 
shortsightedness of citizens could also be a form of ‘myopia’ due to an inability to 
understand the relationship between their legal and cultural practices and the 
overall impact they have on a transnational level in terms of political, macro-
economic, and other similar effects. In democracies, a sort of ‘refusal to look 
beyond’ may often colonize the avenues of consent, however the people—unless 
better solutions are devised—are always the owners of sovereignty and their right 
to exercise it by voting. 
 Besides, he who does not know, does not see; and he who does not see, does 
not want to see. That someone is unable to see or predict something, however, 
does not imply that it does not happen anyway if it is part of the plot of the 
phenomena. Thus, only when something has happened—and sometimes not even 
in that case—will it become clear that the people did not know the meaning 
behind their decisions for the simple reason that they were unable to properly 
represent the scope, the conceptual and spatial perimeter of their consequences. 
To not know the consequences of their actions or choices, however, means not 
knowing what the actions themselves mean. But the meaning of any object or 
phenomenon, reduced to a category of interpretation, can be understood by 
examining a list of its implications. These implications, included in the checklist 
that defines each category, become categorical or conceptual connotations10. 
                    ___________________________ 
10 The ongoing transformation of the implications (also those springing from experience) in 
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Knowing something—be it phenomenon, object or word—means therefore 
learning to imagine even its pragmatic implications, the same ones that are 
produced through the space of experience and mold it. In many respects—thus 
returning to European political issues—if nation-citizens did not grasp the 
connections between the local and the transnational before, the connections 
between their own behavioral patterns and their spatial implications, then not only 
were they unaware of the actual meaning of their own culture and laws but even of 
their existential geography. 
 The considerations just laid out are useful in demonstrating the 
continuity/coextensiveness between word and space, between categorical frames 
and spatial boundaries. This continuity depends on the phenomenon in which, 
during the production and perception of meaning and sense, those frames tend to 
be transformed into boundaries, and vice versa. Experience tends to put both the 
categorical perimeters and the spatial borders under constant stress. It urges 
people to develop new meanings to solve the problems posed by the environment 
and its mobile and liquefying vital barriers. In so doing, human beings use 
imagination and fantasy, producing genuine migrations of connotation or semantic 
implication from one categorical spectrum into another. Somehow, they trans-late, 
so that connotative elements migrate from one categorical context to another, 
generating cognitive metaphors, that is, new lenses for looking at the world and 
experiencing it. Humans use knowledge already acquired, then re-articulate it, 
manipulate it, and in this way create new possibilities, new forms of experience. 
Human action, driven by new patterns of knowledge, however, is projected into 
space by reshaping its boundaries, connecting the elements that defined previous 
connotative semiotic relations and phenomenal connections in new ways. All this 
does not occur, however, in a vacuum, but rather in the same space that the 
symbolically-oriented action is simultaneously shaping. It forges that space using 
imagination and fantasy as chisels for unearthing the continuity between the 
frames connotations present in discrete categorical frames and disagreggating 
connotative sets previously represented and experienced as they were packaged 
into conceptual units11. Everything unfolds along a stream of transformations and 
metamorphoses that take form from the semiotic space populated and constantly 
put in motion by the still unmapped flows of connotative indices. That 
primogenital space, and yet perpetually coexistent with the categorical cosmos that 
fuels its metamorphosis, corresponds to the Platonic "Kora”12. Its’ analysis, of its 
                    ___________________________                
different from Aristotelian theory of essences. About the radial approach to categorization see 
George Lakoff, Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things: What Categories Reveal About the Mind (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press 1987). 
11 For a critical analysis of the theoretical-epistemological frame of such considerations, especially 
in the field of critical geography, see the essays included in the followings texts: Ben Anderson and 
Paul Harrison, The Promise of Non-Representational Theories, in Taking-Place: Non-Representational Theories 
and Geography, ed. Anderson and Harrison (Farham-Burlington: Ashgate, 2010), 1-34; Stephen 
Daniels et al., eds., Evisioning Landscapes, Making Worlds: Geography and Humanities (London-New 
York: Routledge, 2011). 
12 See John Sallis, Chorology: On the Beginning in Plato’s Timaeus, (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press 2009). See, moreover, Derrida’s insights in Plato’s chóra: Jacques Derrida, 1993, Khôra, (Paris: 
Galilée, 1993); even if the deconstructionist approach and its post-modern endpoints lie at the 
polar opposite of my conception of chorology and its possible legal uses. Some further insights, 
closer to my rendering of chóra can be found in Julia Kristeva, Revolution in Poetic Language (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1984) and in the related distinction between symbols and signs. 
Actually, my approach to chorology derives from the combination of Peirce’s semiotics with the 
investigations carried out within critical geography and, recently, legal geography. See respectively: 
Gunnar Olsson, Abysmal: A Critique of Cartographic Reason, (Chicago-London: Chicago University 
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own reality, dual and coextensively semantic and physical, ideal and material, 
eidetic and experiential, is the ‘chorology’. And it is exactly a legal-chorological 
perspective that can justify and open the pathway towards intercultural integration 
within Europe, and the world. It enables us to figure out the ongoing change of 
pace in the way people perceive political space within the EU. I will try to briefly 
explain why. 
 What Europeans even recently have hardly been able to understand and 
accept, that is, a space of experience beyond their nation-states, now seems to have 
become an asset, perhaps sometimes criticized, but in any case acquired through 
the imagination and action of all. From this very moment as well as retrospectively, 
it's hard to say what has come first: the development of an area of trans-national 
experience or the symbolic representation of the actions that produced it. Probably 
both have been emerging at the same time, slowly spreading awareness of a new 
political and existential space—even if, perhaps, without a shared consciousness of 
its production through the cumulative succession of seemingly unrelated individual 
actions. This silent but pervasive phenomenon, resembling the restless swarming 
of an anthill, has slowly reconfigured the space, enlivened by the increasingly 
frequent and intense transit of people, objects, capital and interests that mark the 
meaning and destiny of individuals throughout Europe today. 
 An increasing number of people enter into contracts, buy real estate, work, 
launch businesses, create relationships, etc., while straddling national borders and 
crossing and recrossing them continuously. Along their new routes they feel, more 
than ever before, the weight of cultural differences, ethnic traditions, and the 
ethical and legal mentalities experienced over time in each country. Through the 
lens of this greater understanding, they "see" the implications of the ultra-local, 
ultra-national dimensions of the choices taken and implemented "here and now,” 
the inter-spatial scope of the conceptual and axiological paradigms used for 
operating them, the chorological projections of the representative schemes utilized 
to calculate consequences and, therefore, the sense of their actions. This renewed 
"seeing" motivates a number of their initiatives but it is also the consequence of 
them. The redefinition of the categorical  
boundaries and the frames of meaning that supply this chorological vision 
develop into a perception of new spaces and result from new ways of "translation" 
of and between different peoples across multiple and previously inconceivable 
contexts. 
 The ability to seize the semiotic implications of actions previously unnoticed is 
the quintessence of intercultural translation and also its axis of legitimation. The 
answer to the questions raised above by the Devil's Advocate against intercultural 
law lies in this precise capacity and its indispensability for mapping the real context 
of the projection and implementation of individual and collective purposes. An 
effective dialogue between European cultures undertaken through an intercultural 
approach to legal experience within Community spaces should be read as the 
inevitable outcome of an acquired awareness. This precisely concerns the 
platforms of relations among the manifold phenomena that orchestrate the 
ongoing polyphonic intertwining of individual, local and particular vicissitudes. 
                    ___________________________                
Harrison, “The promise,” 1-34; and, for legal geography, David Delaney, The Spatial, the Legal and The 
Pragmatics of World-Making: Nomospheric Investigations (Abingdon-New York: Routledge, 2010); Irus 
Braverman et al., eds., Expanding Spaces of Law: a Timely Legal Geography, (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2014). In any case, ‘chorology’ is a term that belongs both to the geographical 
tradition and philosophical thought, even if with different connotations: see Kenneth R. Olwig, 
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Developing an accurate chorologic vision of the socio-political dynamics of the 
EU area is the keystone of an epistemological analysis regarding the relationships 
between interculture and law. From this point, it is fairly easy to see why 
intercultural translation between different cultural “Others” becomes a prerequisite 
for understanding the implications of planned national legislations. The exercise of 
individual State sovereignty as well as of personal autonomy only make sense if 
they are able to gauge their consequences, and therefore their meanings, and of 
course the subsequent reactions and countermoves of Others. Seeing, translating 
and transacting with the Other than Self means, in other words, knowing the Other 
of Self that results from the inevitable interaction between one’s own actions and 
those of others. Coexistence in a common chorologic weft makes Otherness part 
and parcel of each one’s Future and, at the same time, makes the intercultural 
translation/transaction synonymous with foreseeability. 
 Now, the law punctuates the lives of all European populations, insinuating 
itself down into the most minute folds of individual actions. Deciphering it 
through the kaleidoscope of its cultural differentiations will not be possible 
without an effort towards anthropological weighting. On the other hand, the 
cultural grammar of European populations is strictly controlled through the sieve 
of legal qualifications. It follows that intercultural dialogue and inter-normative 
dialogue must go hand in hand, to avoid the inevitable failure of both. To achieve 
this, it is necessary, however, to employ a translation methodology that takes a 
‘horizontal’ rather than a hierarchical/pyramidal approach, and has an inclusive 
attitude towards human and/or fundamental rights. Since intercultural dialogue 
and inter-normative connections must go in pairs, it follows that the translation 
between the legal frameworks of the various European countries in relation to 
specific areas should be conducted and gauged according to the problems and 
chorological-cultural exigencies of the people. Intersubjectivity, with all of its 
routes and its plots, has to be pointed towards an analysis that crosses cultures and 
rights, if common and inclusive legal-cultural platforms capable of germinating a 
European area of justice are to develop. 
 Placing emphasis on inter-subjectivity and its topical events is crucial for 
effective intercultural translation. Processing, exchange, and the comparison of 
narratives and crossed contextualization are not purely objective or mechanical 
tasks. The gaze upon the Other, on the meshes of meanings and experiences 
underlying its language, its history observed anthropologically, is not a matter of 
mere recognition. What is seen and surfaced does not speak for itself. The answers 
that emerge from the process of narration/contextualization depend on the 
questions that are asked. These, in turn, are influenced by the problems one means 
to solve, by the way they show themselves, and are then influenced by the 
phenomenology of the present time and the representations that their interlocutors 
will offer. As mentioned above, without an interdisciplinary and historical-
anthropological examination of experience and of the normative apparatuses 
involved in intercultural confrontations, translation will be defective and will lead 
to outcomes characteristic of Euclidean pluralism (as defined previously). The 
investigation of the past and, therefore, the past itself, will not be immune from 
the shadows projected on it by the present. It will say only what is asked of it, and 
what is asked will be, in turn, the consequence of the grafting of signs and imprints 
left on the present from the memory and knowledge of diverse peoples. The 
objectivity of the historical-anthropological gaze is, in short, inevitably circular and 
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 Unfolding connotative landscapes as semiotic outcomes of crossed 
narratives/contextualizations is useful because it allows the overcoming of purely 
morphological differences and gives voice to 'mute parts', namely the implicit 
linguistic and behavioral representations displayed by the dialoguing parties 
included in and overshadowed by words. 
 In many cases, the incommensurability of cultural indices and also of the 
corresponding normative sets is the result of representations and evaluations of 
Otherness, of its codes. Both are developed starting from one’s own cognitive 
schemas and gauged in accordance with the production of morphological 
connotations and appearances masquerading in an ethnocentric mantle of 
objectivity. After all, most intercultural conflicts stem from the overemphasis put 
on particular morphological profiles, typically the most conspicuous and easy to 
grasp, and from their metonymic use. They are taken as parts capable of 
representing the whole, a substitution which produces predictable reactions to 
Otherness. When this occurs, carving out interfaces open to translation and 
transaction from the stiffened weave of encounters becomes very difficult, if not 
even impossible. Indeed, the same attempt at dialogue verges on becoming 
completely useless, if not counterproductive because it only serves to ingrain 
mutual prejudices even more deeply. 
 To overcome similar ‘idling predicaments’ of intercultural experience, it is 
preferable to circle the issue and work on the 'mute parts'13, that is, all the 
relationships of meaning underlying morphological appearances. To advance in 
this direction, the historical-anthropological approach reveals itself to be essential 
and extraordinarily effective when coupled with the practice of crossed 
narratives/contextualizations. The connotative landscape underlying 
morphological indices is amazingly rich from a semantic point of view and is 
capable of showing axiological, teleological and experiential continuities between 
cultural habits, otherwise doomed to remain unsuspected. It allows words, 
precepts, and gestures to be situated, while identifying their possible genealogies of 
sense. This inter-semiotic cultural play enables a simultaneous deepening of 
knowledge of both the Self and the Other, giving birth, already through its 
creation, to new intercultural ground. Of course, the production of this ground of 
intercultural continuities implies neither an agreement nor an automatic 
evaporation of possible divergences. Rather, it agrees to create a cooperatively-
built lexicon useful for the qualification of reciprocal differences (which, however, 
will never remain the same as when first perceived). 
 It is precisely at this stage that the intercultural use of human and/or 
fundamental rights acquires its specific relevance. Statements of rights are full of 
axiological connotations. After all, it is precisely their aspiration to universality that 
tends to foster the use of axiological semantic categories which are open to 
inclusion and decidedly vague at the same time. An important advantage to these 
broad categories is that they can be made to include connotative elements 
emerging from crossed narratives/contextualizations; in this way much of the 
morphological incompatibility related to cultural and normative differences can be 
overcome, so as to trigger the ‘invention’ of intercultural transaction platforms. In 
many cases, words or behaviors previously deemed to be morphologically 
incompatible may instead become parts of the same axiological/teleological 
                    ___________________________ 
13 See Ricca, Culture interdette, 93 ff. and ibidem for extensive consideration of the differences 
between 'mute parts', intended as a semiotic background that circles around the content of the laws, 
and the notion of cd 'mute law', as developed by comparatists. Regarding ‘mute law,’ see Rodolfo 
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category encapsulated in enunciations of human and/or fundamental rights. At 
that point, a kind of inter-contextual crossing-resonance will be produced between 
the different cultural and normative systems that will make it very difficult to deny 
legitimacy a priori and not allow conducts that are divergent in form but converging 
in sense and axiological relevance. Within such a process, the semantic contents of 
human and/or fundamental rights can work as interfaces of translation, or 
metaphorical grounds, thus 'horizontally' positioned with respect to the parts of 
intercultural and inter-normative encounters and their semiotic frameworks. They 
would function as semiotic-normative agencies ferrying reciprocal Otherness 
across their contexts of meaning, their chorologic-legal circuits. The traditional 
hierarchical-pyramidal positioning of rights statements would be relativized, by 
merging and including them within the translation process, so that they would act 
reflectively within each cultural-legal system only when intercultural translation is 
already underway. Moreover, this would avoid the hyper-relativistic and 
antagonistic-identitarian inflection of the semantic vagueness of statements of 
rights, the subsequent strategies of exclusion and conflict, so as to disclose new 
opportunities for dialogue and inclusion. The intercultural and 'horizontal' use of 
rights discourse might otherwise inspire acts of translation and transaction 
oriented toward the creation of conceptual and normative patterns positioned to 
organize an inter-European area of coexistence, communication and justice. 
 The overcoming of barriers and morphological rigidities means averting 
dangerous identitarian antagonisms. However, also in this case, what is at issue is 
not merely a reconnaissance survey. The creation of categories that are made 
inclusive by intercultural translation / transaction does not refer to functional 
equivalences already inherent in the different cultural codes and regulations. On 
the contrary, translating and transacting are always and in every case creative and 
thus intimately political activities. Their results are not knowable in advance, their 
success depends not on the state of affairs but on the sense of responsibility and 
chorologic awareness of the parties involved. The intercultural target will be within 
reach only for those who are able to see in the Other an unavoidable component 
of their own future. A component that must be taken into account when and if 
someone wants to figure out his existential space and its constitutive elements in 
order to manage them through coordinated and intelligent action. In every case, 
this attitude must be reciprocally embraced. Failing a flow of symmetrical efforts 
towards a reciprocal recognition, the aspirations to dominate, to exercise power 
over the Other, and the contrivance of devices aiming to neutralize his defenses, 
will inevitably prevail. The offspring of this will be the inability to produce 'spaces 
of prediction' as to the consequences of one’s own actions, for these can be 
exclusively the result of bi- or multi-lateral trust and collaboration. As anyone 
knows, however, human history and its disasters are punctuated by the illusion of 
being able to neutralize the Other’s subjectivity, due to a tendency to see this 
strategy as the most expeditious way to achieve one’s own particular goals. That it 
is the shortest way but also the most shortsighted, however, history tries endlessly 
to teach us, even if we humans rarely prove to be good students. 
 The construction of a European intercultural space of harmonious inter-
subjective relationships represents a truly epic occasion, were we to be equal to our 
potential, an opportunity that unfortunately we Europeans risk losing. In my view, 
there is a tremendous amount of work to be done 'from below,’ endeavoring to re-
write intercultural grammars for quotidian life and fulfilling the 
translation/transaction of legal paradigms through interdisciplinary commitment. 
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remedy to the resentments never placated and filed in the cultural consciousness of 
the people involved, at the dawn of modernity, in the construction of European 
nation-states.14. In many cases, the processes of national framing and 
homologation were imposed from above, by gestures of pure power totally 
disengaged from anthropological inclusion of and among different peoples. The 
state legal systems, in a completely specular way, overwhelmed anthropic 
landscapes teeming with cultural differences, silencing them under the stifling 
mantle of a ‘legal equality grammar’ riddled with meanings and axiological 
coordinates not shared by the diverse and manifold ethnic components of the 
rising 'nation'. The re-emergence of regional autonomy movements now at the 
forefront of Europe and more recently embodied by Scottish and Catalan 
referendums and/or plebiscites, are clear signs of the lack of anthropological 
knowledge that marked the political and legal experience of the making of the 
‘modern’ Old Continent15. 
 The intercultural difficulties that have crippled attempts to elaborate common 
European legal disciplines in different areas (from contracts to succession) provide 
good reasons to rethink the modern state experience and address its deficiencies 
through the construction of an area of justice responsive to cultural differences. 
What is to be avoided, I argue, are: a) a repeated form of the top-down imposition 
of legal schemes that are socio-culturally alien to recipients; or, alternatively, b) 
institutional compromises that leave ongoing exigencies of cultural composition 
uncontrolled and uncontrollable and instead abandoned to the logic of a local 
autonomy completely broken away from the inescapable dynamics of transnational 
interdependence. In short, European institutions have to decide to resist the 
temptation of aligning their actions to a Euclidean pluralism presented in two-
headed, but only apparently opposite, manifestations. Both the political-
nomothetic strategies just cited are the result of misleading chorological visions, 
and a ‘European Union’ that would preach and practice them would only sow the 
                    ___________________________ 
14 In this regard, I would not be as certain as Shore is in regards to the processes of cultural 
nationalization coextensive with the birth and establishment of modern national states having 
overcome all their difficulties, and that the reactions produced by the overwhelming of 
anthropological dynamics extant in territories by centralized powers and engulfed in state 
frameworks are, so to speak, ‘at peace.’ See Cris Shore Building Europe: The Cultural Politics of 
European Integration (New York: Routledge, 2000), and specifically Id., “Whither European 
Citizenship? Eros and Civilization Revisited,” European Journal of Social Theory 7(2) (2004): 40. 
15 It is striking that regional resurgence is often accompanied by ethno-national radicalism, 
characteristically oriented against immigration but, strangely, grafted onto the claim of cultural, 
religious and legal traditions, allegedly shared across all of the EU, and in this respect distinct from 
those of the 'rest of the world.’ The 'fortress of Europe' is the offspring of these contradictory 
imaginaries. A fortress that seems to be defended with even more force towards the outside as 
there are growing divisions haunting the inside. The contradiction, however, is only apparent. It 
depends on whether intra-European and extra-European or global dimensions of interculturality 
are two communicating vessels. Learning to manage intercultural relations with Otherness 
originating from the extra-European dimension provides excellent know-how to avoid falling into 
the trap of a proclaimed but inexistent infra-European cultural homogeneity. Conversely, a 
frequent practice of translation/transactions between European cultures would allow for an 
analysis of national cultures and their rights as circuits open to intercultural relations on a global 
scale. Moreover, the European chorology is interwoven with the global, which penetrates even into 
the most intimate plots of life conducted within nations and their cities. Accordingly, also within 
the circuit of intercultural Europe, people and institutions would miss the target if they were unable 
to envisage the intra-EU Other as a global actor. All of this without even having taken into account 
the presence of non-Western cultures and their representatives (thanks to contemporary migration 
flows) within the territory historically identified as Europe. On this issue, however, I refer to Ricca 
Oltre Babele; Id., Culture interdette; Mario Ricca., “Diritto Errante,” Democrazia e sicurezza IV, 4, 
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seeds of its own self-dissolution. 
 In any case, the main symptom of the inefficiency of policies aprioristically 
imposed from above is the spread of corruption reported at both national and 
European levels, as well as within States-Community bureaucratic relationships16. 
Indeed, legal devices that do not speak the language of social ethics, understood 
and practiced by the people, the very subjects of law, are fatally destined to 
produce circuits of deviance and corruption. Conversely, the answer to the 
question "why do people obey the law" has an anthropological and cultural-
emotional aspect that is too often neglected. Experiences such as the Italian17 or 
the Yugoslav18 one, marked by relatively recent processes of national unification 
and administered without any effort to integrate ethnic-cultural differences, know 
diverse but equally dramatic repercussions. Mafias who lord over the territory and 
raging ethnic conflicts are both the sad offspring of operations of unification and 
juridification managed by a blind dirigisme, that fails to make the law and relevant 
institutions pay attention to anthropological lexicons inflected and acted upon in 
the daily life of the people. 
 And yet, even in the most attentive inquiries conducted by political scientists 
and lawyers, the anthropological deficit that haunts State or European legislative 
language remains without its own position in the taxonomy of the causes of 
corruption. In the same public opinion, the only ‘legitimate' reason recognized as 
the determinant of the recent Scottish and Catalan oppositions remains exclusively 
the economic one. The only explanatory perspective provided by the media 
follows a kind of fixed script that narrates how the wealthiest and most powerful 
side, able to exploit certain resources, is eager to pull themselves free of those who 
depend on them and compete for the division of ‘common’ wealth. The cultural 
reasons seem to be regarded as purely specious. The invisibility of the "culture" 
component is, however, a paradox to be pondered and deserves some explanation. 
Could it be so because in the absence of any cultural competence none of us 
would be able to make such apparently culture-free judgments? 
4. Euclidean pluralism proved by positive law 
In order to complete the discourse developed so far in a legal-positive way, I 
propose the analysis of a normative statement of the EU that exemplifies, in a way 
I would deem almost spectacular, a concrete implementation of Euclidean 
                    ___________________________ 
16 See Dirk Tänzler et al., eds., The Social Construction of Corruption in Europe (Aldershot: Ashgate, 
2012). 
17 See Donatella della Porta and Alberto Vannucci, When Anti-Corruption Policy Fails: The Italian Case 
Eighteen Years After the mani pulite Investigations, in The Social Construction, ed. Tänzler et al., 133-61: 
who, however, does not specifically identify the legal-anthropological causes underlying the 
phenomenon of corruption in Italy. An exception, in the same essay collection, is represented by 
the article written by Luis de Sousa, ‘Above the Law, Below Ethics’: Some Findings on Portuguese Attitudes 
Towards Corruption, ibidem, 245-63, for the accuracy and depth of his psycho-anthropological analysis 
of Portuguese corruption. A discourse amenable to be extended to all the Southern European 
countries. From an anthropological point of view, but not concerned with the dichotomy between 
law and underlying customs, see Italo Pardo, Between Morality and Law: Corruption, Anthropology and 
Comparative Society (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004); Id., “Who Is Corrupt? Anthropological Reflection on 
the Moral, the Criminal, and the Borderline,” in Human Affairs, 23(2) (2013), 124-147; Dieter Haller 
and Cris Shore, eds. Corruption: Anthropological Perspectives (London-Ann Arbor (MI): Pluto Press 
2005). 
See also Karen Sykes, ed., Ethnographies of Moral Reasoning: Living Paradoxes of a Global Age (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009). 
18 See Robert M. Hayden R.M., Blueprints for a House Divided: The Constitutional Logic of the Yugoslav 
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pluralism. It comes to the “Regulation (EU) no. 650/2012 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2012 on jurisdiction, applicable law, 
recognition and enforcement of decisions and acceptance and enforcement of 
authentic instruments in matters of succession and on the creation of a European 
certificate of succession.” This text deals with a topic among the more ‘sensitive,’ 
culturally and anthropologically speaking, that is, the intergenerational transmission 
of wealth. 
 The normative document—it should be said—follows a previously failed 
attempt to produce common European legislation in matters of succession. This 
script has already been seen in other areas of legal experience. The Regulation is in 
some ways a makeshift solution. It combines a bit of a centralizing tendency with a 
bit of pluralism. Somehow, it is a consequence of the deficiency of intercultural 
dialogue in drafting European legislation, but it may also be due, in turn, to a lack 
of intercultural practice. 
 Due to space constraints, here I simply offer a reproduction of certain 
normative provisions, with a few added comments. This is in order to leave it to 
the reader to ascertain the traits of the Euclidean way of understanding pluralism 
within the legal discourse of the European Institutions. 
 I will start from point (6) of the "considered" premise of the normative text, 
going on to explain, then, the subsequent points: 
(6) At its meeting in Brussels on 10 and 11 December 2009 the European 
Council adopted a new multi-annual programme called ‘The Stockholm 
Programme – An open and secure Europe serving and protecting citizens’. In that 
programme the European Council considered that mutual recognition should be 
extended to fields that are not yet covered but are essential to everyday life, for 
example succession and wills, while taking into consideration Member States’ legal 
systems, including public policy (ordre public), and national traditions in this area. 
A characteristic Euclidean feature may be identified in this provision. The 
intentions and proclamations adhere to cultural and social aspects, while the 
implementations adhere only to technical-legal ones: legal systems, public order 
and national traditions, the latter included—please note— as a subclass of the 
category of  “law.” 
(7) The proper functioning of the internal market should be facilitated by 
removing the obstacles to the free movement of persons who currently face 
difficulties in asserting their rights in the context of a succession having cross-
border implications. In the European area of justice, citizens must be able to 
organise their succession in advance. The rights of heirs and legatees, of other 
persons close to the deceased and of creditors of the succession must be 
effectively guaranteed.  
Here it is possible to track an index of misleading chorology inherent in 
Euclidean pluralism. It is recognizable in the quite presumptive reference to the 
European area of justice. An empty space, generated by the institutional power of 
the EU, hosts differences that are framed as being formalistically coordinated, 
regardless of any processes or procedures for intercultural translation/transaction. 
The utter absence of consideration of the anthropological dimension seems to 
betray a radically deficient vision of the cultural assumptions which necessarily 
underlie a European citizenship taken in its substance and, therefore, placed in the 
presumption of shared daily life habits.  
(10) This Regulation should not apply to revenue matters or to administrative 
matters of a public-law nature. It should therefore be for national law to 
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calculated and paid, whether these be taxes payable by the deceased at the time of 
death or any type of succession-related tax to be paid by the estate or the 
beneficiaries. It should also be for national law to determine whether the release of 
succession property to beneficiaries under this Regulation or the recording of 
succession property in a register may be made subject to the payment of taxes. 
I only observe that the criteria of exclusion or assimilation specified in this 
standard could produce, at the time of succession, cultural effects of enormous 
scope which are inevitably conflictual for relations between the subjects involved. 
(12) Accordingly, this Regulation should not apply to questions relating to 
matrimonial property regimes, including marriage settlements as known in some 
legal systems to the extent that such settlements do not deal with succession 
matters, and property regimes of relationships deemed to have comparable effects 
to marriage. The authorities dealing with a given succession under this Regulation 
should nevertheless, depending on the situation, take into account the winding-up 
of the matrimonial property regime or similar property regime of the deceased 
when determining the estate of the deceased and the respective shares of the 
beneficiaries.  
Here, we do not even need to consider the warning character of the provision. 
What matters, rather, is to observe how the centralization of the criteria for 
determining hereditary assets could create huge inequalities in cultural terms. 
(15) This Regulation should allow for the creation or the transfer by succession 
of a right in immovable or movable property as provided for in the law applicable 
to the succession. It should, however, not affect the limited number (‘numerus 
clausus’) of rights in rem known in the national law of some Member States. A 
Member State should not be required to recognise a right in rem relating to 
property located in that Member State if the right in rem in question is not known 
in its law. 
In this case, the possible inter-normative conflicts, therefore also 
intersubjective, are addressed through merely legalistic-positive instruments. The 
influence of culture on the institutes involved, as well as personal, ethical, and ideal 
expectations tailored according to cultural codes, seem invisible in the eyes of the 
European legislator. 
(16) However, in order to allow the beneficiaries to enjoy in another Member 
State the rights which have been created or transferred to them by succession, this 
Regulation should provide for the adaptation of an unknown right in rem to the 
closest equivalent right in rem under the law of that other Member State. In the 
context of such an adaptation, account should be taken of the aims and the 
interests pursued by the specific right in rem and the effects attached to it. For the 
purposes of determining the closest equivalent national right in rem, the authorities 
or competent persons of the State whose law applied to the succession may be 
contacted for further information on the nature and the effects of the right. To 
that end, the existing networks in matters of judicial cooperation in civil and 
commercial matters could be used, as well as any other available means facilitating 
the understanding of foreign law. 
This statement is symptomatic of the resistance of the drafters of European 
legal texts to the possibility of crossing the strictly normative boundaries of legal 
discourse when addressing matters of intercultural relevance. The instruments 
taken into account are private international law, comparative law and something 
surprisingly indeterminate: "any other available means facilitating the 
understanding of foreign law." 




®UNIO - EU LAW JOURNAL  Vol. 1, July 2015 
Z  
25                                                                                           Mario Ricca 
 
 
intercultural translation based on historical and anthropological inquiries? 
 Space constraints prevent me from continuing on with an analysis of the text 
that follows. I refer the reader to the text of the Regulation for “considered” nos. 
23-25, which deal with the circumstances of life of the deceased; n. 29, which takes 
into account out of court resolution of disputes regarding succession, also in 
accordance with the laws of states different to the member state, and so raising 
issues of intercultural intra-European and extra-European or global relevance; n. 
34, which talks about the 'harmonious functioning of justice' without any referral 
to the cultural dimension of the people involved, but only with regard to profiles 
and procedural solutions; n. 38, which confronts the necessity to ascertain whether 
the choice of law to be applied by the testator is not directed to frustrate the 
expectations of those entitled to legitimate shares, all specifications once again 
lacking any reference to any kind of anthropologically-oriented evaluation; n. 58, 
where it is possible find a hint of culture via Article 21 of the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights. However, the principle of non-discrimination is likely to 
receive a pyramidal application, not drawing on a methodology suited to support a 
horizontal implementation engaged in a process of intercultural translation; n. 71, 
which indirectly conjures up the problem of ‘good faith’; the legal aspects–explicit 
and implicit ones (the 'mute parts' of legal discourse)–of the information contained 
in the European Certificate of Succession seem to be ignored, when they could 
instead be evaluated through an anthropological-intercultural assessment; n. 81, 
where Euclidean pluralism finds explicit expression in the reference to the rules of 
respect and implementation of the Fundamental Rights of the European Union. 
The Regulation complies with them in textual and centralized terms. The courts 
will have to respect them by application, taking into account the right to self-
determination of the member states and their people: “how," using what 
methodology, however, is not specified. 
 Turning to the legislation itself, Articles 4, 22 and 5 are relevant; they 
determine the two main criteria for the identification of the applicable law and the 
competent court in order to settle the succession of people who have resided in 
two or more European countries during the course of their lives. These criteria are 
(1) the place of habitual residence at the time of death and (2) the choice of law. In 
this regard, it is questionable whether the principles of habitual residence and of 
the choice of law, provided that the chosen law coincides with the deceased’s 
country of citizenship, would respect the cultural identity of the deceased and the 
heirs, or instead reflect those interests tied to national sovereignty and its claims 
for economic-territorial control. A similar consideration is also extensible to art. 
10.2 regarding the subsidiary jurisdiction gauged according to the place where the 
assets of the estate are located, and art. 12.2, both of which tend to assemble 
centralist policies and localistic exceptions, alternatively legitimized on the basis of 
procedural devices. 
 Articles 20, 21 and 22, establish the general criteria for determining the law 
applicable to succession. Habitual residence and choice of the testator, as 
mentioned, are the primary considerations. The second declines the scope of the 
subject-area correlation in a liberal fashion, implicitly embodied in the criterion of 
residence. A very interesting reference is found in Article 21.2, which provides: 
Where, by way of exception, it is clear from all the circumstances of the case 
that, at the time of death, the deceased was manifestly more closely connected with 
a State other than the State whose law would be applicable under paragraph 1, the 
law applicable to the succession shall be the law of that other State. 
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closely connected with a State other than the deceased” remain conspicuously 
unresolved. 
 Another significant expression of Euclidean pluralism, and its dual facet is 
Article 25. It disciplines the agreements as to succession and the criteria for stating 
their regime in the case of potential competition of laws. The interesting aspect is 
that this criterion does not apply if one of the parties of the agreement is subject to 
the law of a state that does not provide for such kind of agreements. Similar 
considerations can be advanced for the art. 30. Article 31, concerning the 
adaptation between the figures of rights in rem, reflects the ‘considered’ Article 16, 
analyzed above. 
 Another rule relevant to interculture is Article 37, entitled "States with more 
than one legal system—inter-personal conflicts of laws.” Needless to say, even 
here the analysis criteria are only formalistic, without any reference to cultural 
and/or religious profiles to be evaluated on the basis of anthropological 
assessments. 
 A provision distinctly characterized by Euclidean pluralism is Article 62, which 
introduces the European Certificate of Succession. This article states that the use 
of the Certificate is not mandatory and does not replace other documents used for 
similar purposes in the individual states. Once applied for and issued, however, the 
Certificate will be valid in all member states and produces the effects listed in 
Article 69 in the Member State whose authorities issued it in accordance with the 
Chapter VI of the Regulation. Overarched by the personal autonomy and the 
recognition of the testator’s free choice to request the certificate, once again the 
alternative between transnational homologation and national particularism takes 
precedence, a dialectic or exclusive alternative that risks tearing apart the family life 
of those who will manage the legacy straddling different legal and cultural systems. 
 I close my discourse pointing out that under Article. 83, the Regulation will 
apply to the succession of deceased persons on or after August 17, 2015. I wonder 
if there might still be time to understand the intercultural deficits of this legislation 
taken both as a whole and in its sources of nomothetic inspiration. I raise this issue 
stressing that the use of chorological-intercultural law, and that of human and/or 
fundamental rights in particular, can serve to normatively redefine spaces of 
existence for subjects. If the spaces of experience alter the scope and meaning of 
both the cultural knowledge and legal standards, then working on the words of the 
law through processes of intercultural re-categorization is equivalent to becoming 
able to remodel the cartographies of individual and collective experience. The 
expression "area of justice,” launched by the European legislators, is essentially bi-
directional. It appears as justice unfolds in a spatial frame and, simultaneously, as 
the space of experience is produced from the exercise of justice. Put diversely, this 
means that space and culture, word and space, space and law, indeed all spatial 
categories and linguistic categories or regulations are false dichotomies. Both wings 
of every divide embody entities or magnitudes that are mutually continuous and 
coextensive. In the end, the effort to understand the chorological interweaving 
between rights, spaces and paths of inter-subjectivity is the condition for the future 
sociopolitical geometries of the European Union, at least in the field of human 
relations, if they are to have any hope of infringing upon Euclid’s fifth theorem to 
move towards the realization of an anthropologically inclusive pluralism. Europe 
has been made (perhaps); will we succeed in making Europeans? 
 
